Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will It Do Justice? by Guffey-Landers, Nancy E.
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 2
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will
It Do Justice?
Nancy E. Guffey-Landers
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy E. Guffey-Landers, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will It Do Justice?, 20 Md. J. Int'l L. 199 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol20/iss2/2
ARTICLES
ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
WILL IT DO JUSTICE?
NANCY E. GUFFEY=LANDERS*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 201
II. EXISTING SYSTEM FOR CARRYING OUT JUSTICE AT THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEVEL ..................................................... 203
A. U.S. Domestic Policies on International Judicial Assis-
tance ............................................................. 203
1. Federal Statutory Provisions ........................... 203
a. Evidence Located within Foreign Jurisdic-
tion ................................................ 203
b. Evidence Located in the U.S. Sought by
Foreign Officials ................................ 204
c. Extradition ........................................ 204
d. U.S. Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Criminal Acts .................................... 206
B. U.S. Foreign Policy and Participation in International
Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters ................... 209
1. International Agreements .............................. 209
2. Bilateral Agreements ................................... 209
3. Executive Agreements .................................. 209
4. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties .................... 211
5. Extradition Treaties ..................................... 212
6. Multilateral Treaties .................................... 213
7. INTERPOL ............................................... 214
* Associate, Levy, Kneen, Mariani, Curtin, Wiener, Komfeld & Del Russo, West
Palm Beach; formerly associated with Holzman, Krinzman, Equels & Furia, Miami;
LL.M. in International Law, University of Miami School of Law; J.D., St. Thomas Uni-
versity School of Law.
(199)
200 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
m. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING SYSTEM IN CARRYING OUT JUS-
TICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA ............................... 218
IV. PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ......... 219
A. The International Law Commission's Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court ............................. 219
B. The American Bar Association ("ABA") Task Force's
Proposed Statute for an International Criminal Court ... 220
C. The International Law Commission's Proposed Draft
International Criminal Code ................................. 222
V. ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT ................................................................. 222
A. Creation of an International Criminal Court .............. 222
1. An Institution Created by the U.N. Security
Council Under the Authority of Art. VII of the
U.N. Charter ............................................. 223
2. A Separate Treaty ....................................... 223
3. Other Proposals .......................................... 224
B. Structure of the International Criminal Court System... 224
1. Single International Criminal Court .................. 224
2. Several Different Forums of the International
Criminal Court ......................................... 224
3. Other Proposals .......................................... 225
C. Jurisdictional Issues ........................................... 225
1. Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction ........... 225
2. Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court ........................................... 226
D. Applicable Law ....... ........................................ 227
E. Standing to Bring an Action Before the International
Criminal Court ................................................. 228
F. Enforcement of Violations of "International Crimes"
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court ............................................................. 229
1. Investigations ............................................ 229
a. Current Methods of Investigation ............ 229
b. INTERPOL Agents as Alternative Investi-
gators .............................................. 229
c. INTERPOL Agents as Primary Investiga-
tors of International Crimes ................... 230
2. Extradition of those Accused of Committing In-
temational Crimes ....................................... 231
3. Prosecution of those Accused of Committing In-
ternational Crimes ....................................... 232
[Vol. 20
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
G. Enforcement of Judgments Rendered by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ......................................... 233
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 233
. INTRODUCrION
The creation of a permanent international criminal court has been
considered by some to be the mechanism for meting out justice in the in-
ternational arena. Presently, no permanent international criminal court ex-
ists that has jurisdiction over individuals accused of committing crimes.
The existing International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), although a permanent
institution, has jurisdiction over member-states only and individuals can-
not be brought before it.' In addition, a member-state brought before the
ICJ must consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction and any decision rendered is
not necessarily binding on the parties. 2 In light of the limited jurisdic-
tional and enforcement aspects of the ICJ, an International Criminal
Court, as an entirely new institution for prosecuting individuals accused
of committing international crimes, has been proposed by some, includ-
ing the American Bar Association. 3
Whether an International Criminal Court is capable of carrying out
justice is yet to be seen. Currently, violators of crimes that are of interna-
tional concern are brought to justice through various measures of interna-
tional judicial assistance. The term "international judicial assistance" ref-
ers to the legal assistance that countries are willing to provide to each
other in matters that extend beyond one country's borders.4 A situation
requiring international judicial assistance may arise when evidence is lo-
cated in another country and is needed for a domestic trial, or when one
country seeks the surrender of a fugitive from abroad to be tried in a do-
mestic court.5
Historically, international judicial assistance was not such a promi-
nent concern of nations since crimes were normally territorial and the
ability to enforce crimes committed within a nation's territory could be
accomplished without the need for assistance from abroad. With the In-
dustrial Revolution and the development and advancements in transporta-
1. U.N. CHARTmR art. 93, para 1. Article 93 also provides that "a state which is not
a Member of the United Nations may become party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council." U.N. Charter art. 93, para 2.
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 1062 (1945).
3. See American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court, 28
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 475 (Summer 1994).
4. 3 M. ABBELL & B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDiC AL ASSISTANCE 3 (1990).
5. Id. at 3.
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tion and technology, however, the need for international judicial assis-
tance has steadily increased.6 Advanced modes of travel provide easier
escape by a criminal to a foreign jurisdiction. Furthermore, technology
has increased the possibility of crimes being committed across borders. 7
These developments have led to a body of crimes that have intrinsic in-
ternational aspects. Included among these crimes are drug trafficking,
money laundering, terrorism and human rights violations.
The development of international judicial assistance and the carrying
out of justice in the international arena has become of increasing concern
in the United States. Up until the 1970s the United States was largely
protected from international criminal activity due to geographic restric-
tions.8 With the increase in international travel, commerce, and telecom-
munications, however, this protection eroded.9 In response, the United
States authorized federal courts to extend aid to foreign courts in ob-
taining testimony in this country for criminal proceedings abroad.'0 In
1964, the U.S. Congress revised the existing statutes and designated the
Department of State as the proper authority to administer requests for in-
ternational judicial assistance between the United States and foreign
countries." Since 1964, the U.S. has enacted additional federal statutes
pertaining to international judicial assistance. Moreover, in recent years,
the U.S. has negotiated several international agreements that provide for
international judicial assistance and cooperation in specific criminal
matters.12
This article will discuss the existing system for carrying out justice
at the international level and will forth proposals that may provide a
more effective way to bring international criminals to justice. In particu-
lar, this article sets forth the proposals for the creation of an effective In-
ternational Criminal Court, including the proposal for a more active role
of the International Criminal Police Organization ("INTERPOL') in
fighting international crime.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 5-6.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Bruno A. Ristau, Overview of International Judicial Assistance, 18 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAWYER 525, 526 (1984).
11. Id. at 528.
12. See infra notes 60-102 and accompanying text.
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U. EXISTING SYSTEM FOR CARRYING OUT JUSTICE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
A. U.S. Domestic Policies of International Judicial Assistance
1. Federal Statutory Provisions
a. Evidence Located Within Foreign Jurisdiction
Under U.S. law, several federal statutes promote and facilitate inter-
national judicial assistance. Federal statutory provisions detail procedures
for U.S. authorities who seek judicial assistance from abroad, and also
procedures that U.S. officials or judges may follow when foreign coun-
tries request U.S. judicial assistance.
The United States Department of State is designated as the "Central
Authority" for international judicial assistance purposes.13 As the Central
Authority, the U.S. Department of State receives domestic requests for
information located abroad and then transmits the request to the appropri-
ate foreign authority.' 4 Requests by the Central Authority to the proper
authorities of another country are in the form of Letters of Request. 5
Letters of Request are formal written petitions addressed to the appropri-
ate authority of the foreign country seeking information or assistance in
an investigation. 16 Requests pertaining to criminal matters are normally
processed by the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, of the
U.S. Department of Justice and transmitted directly to the appropriate
foreign official.' 7
Additionally, upon application by the United States, statutes of limi-
tations may be stayed to permit the United States prosecutor to obtain
foreign evidence.'8 A U.S. District Court may grant this stay if it finds
13. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781(a)(1) & (2)(1994).
14. Id.
15. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 2555, 847
U.N.T.S. 231, 231. The Convention sets forth procedures for signatories to request and
obtain evidence located in another signatory's country for use in civil and commercial
matters. Id. at 241 and 2557. Pursuant to the Hague Convention, signatories are required
to establish a "Central Authority" to receive requests from other signatories for evidence
located in their countries. Id. at 241 and 2558. Since the Hague Convention applies to
civil and commercial matters, not criminal matters, it is outside the scope of this paper.
16. Letters of Requests are also referred to as letters rogatory. See Tiedemann v. The
Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1941). "Letters rogatory are the medium whereby one
country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its
own courts... to assist the administration of justice in the former country." Id.
17. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3292 (1985).
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by a preponderance of the evidence that an official request has been
made for foreign evidence and that it reasonably appears that the evi-
dence is located in the foreign country. 19
b. Evidence Located in the U.S. Sought by Foreign Officials
While the Central Authority is the appropriate channel for domestic
requests for assistance from abroad, it is also the proper receiver of re-
quests from abroad for information or evidence located in the United
States.2 Once a request is submitted by a foreign authority to the Central
Authority, the Central Authority then may direct the request to the proper
U.S. District Court. The U.S. District Courts then have the authority to
order U.S. residents or citizens to give testimony or produce documents
to be presented to a foreign or international tribunal.2' A person, how-
ever, may not be compelled to testify in violation of a legal privilege. 22
c. Extradition
The previous statutes relate to international judicial assistance as it
pertains to obtaining information and evidence that is located in a partic-
ular country. Yet, the evidence and information is of little consequence if
the international criminal cannot be apprehended and brought before the
appropriate forum. Therefore, several countries have entered into extradi-
tion treaties which complement other existing international agreements
relating to evidence gathering. Extradition may be defined as the "sur-
render by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of
an offense outside of its own territory and within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the other which, being competent to try and punish him, demands
the surrender." 23
The scope of the U.S. federal statutory provisions on extradition is
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3181, which also lists the countries that have en-
tered into extradition agreements with the United States. According to the
statute, extradition of persons located in the United States who are ac-
19. Id. There are some limitations to this practice. Specifically, the total of all peri-
ods of suspension for one offense "shall not exceed 3 years and shall not extend a period
within which a criminal case must be initiated for more than 6 months if all foreign
countries take final action before such period would expire without regard to this sec-
tion." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3292(c)(1) & (2).
20. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781.
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 (1994).
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782(b).
23. See Taverez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 668 F.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)(empha-
sis omitted)(quoting Ter Linden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902)).
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cused of committing crimes in other countries may only occur when the
U.S. and that country have entered into an extradition treaty.24 Ironically,
U.S. case law suggests that the United States may surrender a fugitive to
a foreign country in the absence of an extradition treaty as a matter of
comity.15
Other provisions pertain to foreign fugitives located in the United
States. 26 Specifically, a judge may issue a warrant for the seizure of any
person charged under a complaint with having committed a crime listed
under the extradition treaty of another country.v A foreign fugitive is not
necessarily protected by procedural safeguards while in the United States
and during the extradition process. For example, the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence are not applicable in extradition hearings. 8 Consequently, hearsay
and other evidence may become a part of the record in an extradition
proceeding.29 A fugitive from another country, who is detained pending
actual extradition, may apply to be discharged if the extradition does not
take place within two months.30 However, the judge may refuse to dis-
charge the fugitive if sufficient cause shows that a discharge should not
be ordered.31
Other procedural aspects of the extradition process are contained in
18 U.S.C. §§ 3189, 3190, and 3191. Section 3189 mandates that extradi-
tion hearings conducted pursuant to a treaty or convention be held in a
public place. Section 3190 requires proper authentication of documents
and other evidence presented at an extradition hearing. This measure pur-
ports to ensure the evidence will later be received for evidentiary pur-
24. 18 U.S.C.A. 3181 (1994).
25. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). Chief Justice Marshall
declared that nothing precluded a sovereign power from extending recognition to an-
other's penal laws where it chooses to do so and therefore a fugitive could be surrendered
to another country as a matter of comity. Id. at 122-23.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. This Section further states that if upon such a hearing, "the
judge deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the
proper treaty or convention, he shall certify same, together with a copy of all testimony
taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition
of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, ac-
cording to the stipulations of the treaty or convention, and he shall issue his warrant for
the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such
surrender shall be made." Id.
28. United States v. Taitz, 134 F.R.D. 288, 289 (S.D. Cal. 1991). Fugitives facing
extradition, however, are accorded due process. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S.
5, 9 (1936).
29. 18 U.S.C. §3184.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1994).
31. Id.
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poses in the foreign country. Section 3191 states that an indigent fugitive
has a right to have certain witnesses located within the United States to
testify on his behalf. The judge may subpoena a witness to testify on the
fugitive's behalf. The costs and fees for the calling of that witness are
paid in the same manner as a witness who is subpoenaed on behalf of
the United States.3 2 This provision, as indicated above, pertains to quali-
fied witnesses who are residing in the United States and not to witnesses
located in a foreign country.33
d. U.S. Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Criminal Acts
The aforementioned federal statutes relate to the acquisition of evi-
dence, the surrender of fugitives, and the methods and procedures of in-
temational judicial assistance in such cases. The federal statutory provi-
sions that are discussed below focus on substantive crimes that are
committed outside U.S. borders, but nevertheless are crimes under U.S.
law. Several federal statutory provisions make the distribution of cocaine
in the United States a criminal offense. For example, the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)3 4 prohibits the actual distri-
bution of cocaine into the United States, participation in conspiracy to
distribute cocaine into the United States, or the manufacture of cocaine
for importation into the United States are criminal offenses under U.S.
law.35
In supplementing RICO, the Bank Secrecy Act attempts to combat
the problem of tax evasion and money laundering.36 The Act imposes re-
porting requirements on financial institutions, both foreign and domestic,
for transactions involving U.S. currency.3 7 In turn, the Anti-Money Laun-
dering Act 38 supplements the Bank Secrecy Act by declaring that laun-
dering of monetary instruments and monetary transactions in property de-
rived from specific unlawful activity is a federal criminal offense. 39 The
Anti-Money Laundering Act declares it unlawful to knowingly participate
in transactions that would promote illegal activity, defraud the Internal
Revenue Service, or avoid reporting requirements under federal and state
law.40 Under the act, illegal activities include, but are not limited to, kid-
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3191 (1994).
33. Matter of Extradition of Koskotas, 127 F.R.D. 13, 28 (D. Mass. 1989).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1) & 1962.
36. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1983).
37. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313.
38. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956-1957 (West Supp. 1996).
39. Id.
40. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (a)(1)(A) & (B).
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napping, extortion, defrauding an international bank, concealment of as-
sets, and the manufacture, sale or distribution of a controlled substancet.
4
Finally, the act gives the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction over
unlawful activity that is committed by U.S. nationals or that is committed
by non-citizens living in the United States. 42 Persons violating this act are
also subject to criminal penalties of other federal and state law
provisions.43
Other statutes bestow upon U.S. courts the power to prosecute crim-
inal acts of an international nature, such as terrorism and certain human
rights violations, despite the fact that the actual location of the offense
may have occurred in a foreign country.44 Under the "effects doctrine"
U.S. federal courts may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over such
cases.45 The objective-territorial principle allows the United States to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over acts, although committed outside of its borders,
that have harmful effects in the country." Moreover, international law al-
lows nations to exercise jurisdiction over acts that harm national interest
under the protective principle.47 Under the passive personal principle a
nation may exercise jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the victim.s
In addition to the objective-territorial principle, the United States may
base its jurisdiction on principles of international law.49 Therefore, such
offenses as drug-trafficking, money laundering, and tax evasion (to the
extent that there is conduct abroad) may, nevertheless, be subject to
United States jurisdiction.
Other acts over which the United States asserts extraterritorial juris-
diction include those set forth in The Sherman Antitrust Act.5° The Sher-
man Antitrust Act prohibits activities by individuals who monopolize or
attempt to monopolize trade.5' The Antitrust Division of the Department
41. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (c)(7)(B) & (D).
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (f)(1) & (2).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(d).
44. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§§§ 1330-1332, 1350 (1993). Section 1350 grants district
courts jurisdiction over civil actions against aliens for torts committed in violation of in-
ternational law or treaties. Under this provision, acts of torture have been prosecuted in
the United States. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 E2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
46. United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257-58 (1st Cir. 1982).
47. Id. at 257.
48. Id.
49. See Richard D. Gregorie, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Its Use, Its Roots & Its
Viability, 15 NOVA L. REV. 625, 633 (1991)(quoting United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d
255 (1st Cir. 1982)).
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1-7 (1973).
51. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2. In particular, the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any
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of Justice is responsible for the "general enforcement, by criminal and
civil proceedings, of the federal Antitrust laws and other laws relating to
the protection of competition and the prohibition of restraints on trade
and monopolization." 52 The new International Antitrust Enforcement As-
sistance Act of 199453 allows the Antitrust Division to enter into interna-
tional agreements with corresponding agencies from foreign countries in
order to enforce U.S. antitrust laws more effectively against violators lo-
cated outside the borders of the United States.5 4
Under certain circumstances, admiralty and maritime crimes commit-
ted outside the territory of the United States may also be brought under
United States jurisdiction.55 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, it is possible
for U.S. courts to have jurisdiction over "suits [based] on maritime
claims arising out of transactions and occurrences anywhere in the
world," but this jurisdiction is subject to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 56
Moreover, the Export Administration Act57 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193458 also give the U.S. jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted outside its borders. Increased U.S. stock trading by foreign investors,
coupled with U.S. nationals' participation in foreign securities, has in-
creased international capital flow, as well as elevated the incidence of se-
curities fraud.59 This increased activity has led officials to seek prosecu-
tion for extraterritorial violations of the Securities Exchange Act.
Although the Securities Exchange Act does not specifically grant extra-
territorial jurisdiction over violators of its provisions, U.S. courts have
applied an "effects" test and "conduct" test to determine whether indi-
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.40 (1993).
53. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6201-6212 (West Supp. 1996).
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6201. Although the U.S. is a signatory to several mutual legal as-
sistance treaties that could theoretically assist it in obtaining evidence located abroad for
U.S. Antitrust proceedings, most of the evidence needed for Antitrust cases are either
classified or confidential documents. Therefore, the new International Antitrust Enforce-
ment law would enable the U.S. to enter into agreements that would allow each party to
provide otherwise classified or confidential documents in the limited circumstances of
Antitrust proceedings.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
56. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel, 640 F.2d 560, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting G. GLMORE AND C. BLACK. THE LAW
oF ADmmALTv 51 (1975)).
57. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401-2420 (1991).
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g et seq. (1981).
59. See Phillip Wolf, International Securities Fraud: Extraterritorial Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. Rnv. 1 (1995).
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viduals who violate the Securities Exchange Act while outside the United
States should still be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 60 The "ef-
fects" and "conduct" tests determine whether the violations have a sig-
nificant effect within the United States, or whether the violator's actions
were primarily carried out in the United States.6'
B. U.S. Foreign Policy and Participation in International Judicial
Assistance in Criminal Matters
1. International Agreements
In addition to federal statutory provisions, the United States is a sig-
natory to several international agreements which enumerate certain "in-
ternational crimes" and which attempt to facilitate justice in the interna-
tional arena. These international agreements provide methods by which
countries may seek international judicial assistance from each other. Sev-
eral of these types of agreements are discussed below.
2. Bilateral Agreements
Bilateral Agreements may be implemented between two countries in
an effort to combat a significant mutual problem. An example of a bilat-
eral arrangement is the "Narcotics Cooperation Agreement" between
Mexico and the United States.62 This bilateral agreement arose out of the
mutual interest of Mexico and the United States in fighting the importa-
tion of narcotics into both nations and the serious consequences of drug
addiction. 63 The agreement requires Mexico and the United States to
adopt legislative and administrative measures to carry out the agreement's
obligations.64 Additionally, the parties must consult with each other on
actions that may affect the other party in a manner inconsistent with the
purpose of the Agreement.6
3. Executive Agreements
An executive agreement is another type of bilateral agreement. The
President of the United States has the authority to execute executive
60. Id. at 2,4.
61. Id. at 5-13.
62. Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug De-
pendency, Feb. 23, 1989, United States-Mexico, 29 I.L.M. 58 (1990).
63. Id. at 58-59. See also Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial As-
sistance and Related Matters, 18 DENY. . INT'L L. PoucY 339, 348-49 (1990).
64. 29 I.L.M. at 59.
65. Id. at 59. See also Zagaris supra note 63 at 349.
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agreements with foreign governments on particular matters which bind
the country.6 Executive agreements are distinct from U.S. treaties be-
cause the Senate ratification is not necessary.67 For example, the United
States and the United Kingdom formed an executive agreement concern-
ing international judicial assistance that purportedly entered into force in
September, 1982 on behalf of the Cayman Islands.6 The purpose of this
agreement, and similar ones that followed, was to elude business secrecy
laws which effectively hid the profits of drug trafficking activities from
United States officials.69 In addition to the agreement on behalf of Cay-
man Islands, the United States and the United Kingdom negotiated sev-
eral other executive agreements to provide assistance in combatting the
distribution of illegal narcotics from certain British territories, including
the Turks and Caicos Islands, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and
Montserrat. 70 These executive agreements were negotiated and designated
as the first step toward establishing a mutual legal assistance treaty,
which would have been more time consuming.
The "Lockheed Agreement" is yet another type of executive agree-
ment. This type of agreement includes pacts made between the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and the foreign country's counterpart.7' These agree-
ments are unique in that they are limited to a specific investigation or a
specific investigative matter.72 Between 1976 and 1982, the Department
of Justice entered into several "Lockheed Agreements" in an attempt to
investigate and prosecute U.S. aircraft manufacturers accused of bribing
foreign officials. 73 The first such agreement, the Agreement with Japan
on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in Con-
nection with the Lockheed Aircraft Matter,74 entered into force shortly af-
ter the U.S. learned that payments had been made to foreign officials.
The Executive "Lockheed" Agreement created a direct channel for com-
municating requests for assistance, and required each party to use its best
efforts to provide the other with all relevant and material information ob-
66. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
67. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937).
68. In re Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 824 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1106 (1985). Specifically, the agreement allowed a representative of the Office of
International Affairs to request assistance from Cayman Islands police for criminal viola-
tions of the law. Id.
69. Id. at 829.
70. E. Rotman, Research Perspectives on International Criminal Law, 14-15(April
16, 1993) (American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice).
71. 3 Abbell & Ristau, supra note 4, at 85.
72. Id. at 85-86.
73. Id. at 84, 85 n.1.
74. March 23, 1976, U.S.-Japan, 27 U.S.T. 946, T.I.A.S. 8233.
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tained, including documents, depositions, and business records.7 5
4. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Mutual legal assistance treaties may supplement other international
agreements and operate to facilitate international judicial assistance in
criminal matters in addition to domestic legislative provisions. Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties are extremely important; without them, prose-
cutors are often left to rely on letters rogatory and subpoenas in order to
obtain evidence from abroad.7 6 Using Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties,
law enforcement agents are able to make requests directly to appropriate
foreign law enforcement agencies and to bypass the bureaucratic process
of requests via letters rogatory.77
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are more effective and efficient
than letters rogatory for the following reasons: (1) each country has a
duty to provide assistance whereas a request via letter rogatory is not an
obligation, but may be granted at the discretion of the requested coun-
try;7 8 (2) the treaty can, by express provision, stipulate the setting aside
of domestic bank and secrecy laws; and (3) the treaty may include proce-
dures that will ensure that evidence obtained will be admissible in do-
mestic courts.79 For example, the U.S. may require procedures to be fol-
lowed in an investigation abroad so that any evidence obtained in the
foreign country will be admissible in a U.S. court.
The United States Treaty with Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters o was the first U.S. mutual assistance treaty that pro-
vided measures for acquiring evidence of criminal matters in an efficient
and effective manner from Swiss officials. Instead of the use of letters
rogatory, this treaty allowed a more rapid response by allowing a party
to ascertain the address of suspects, testimony or statements of witnesses
or suspects, and documents and evidence. 8' Under similar U.S. mutual le-
75. Id. at 947.
76. Zagaris, supra note 63, at 351.
77. Id. at 352.
78. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 and the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service of Process Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 set forth pro-
cedures for signatories to obtain evidence and serve process in foreign countries that are
signatories to the Conventions. Since both Conventions relate only to civil and commer-
cial matters, not criminal, they are outside the scope of this paper.
79. Zagaris, supra note 63, at 352-53.
80. Treaty Between the United States of America and The Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2033.
81. Id. at 206.
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gal assistance treaties, the requesting country has the authority to specify
the manner in which it wishes to have the requested country execute the
request. The authority of law enforcement officers to require that their re-
quests be executed in accordance with procedures that will allow the evi-
dence obtained to be admissible in a domestic criminal trial is
invaluable.8 2
5. Extradition Treaties
As indicated above, the U.S. has entered into several extradition
treaties with other countries. One such treaty, the Treaty on Extradition
and Cooperation in Penal Matters,83 requires the parties to execute expe-
ditiously "requests" for the exchange of information to prevent and curb
crimes enumerated in the treaty.8 4 Surprisingly, the provisions of the ex-
tradition treaty are not the exclusive means for apprehending a fugitive
from abroad. In fact, in Ex parte Lopez,85 the court held that the U.S.
may recover a fugitive from abroad without complying with the proce-
dures set forth in an existing extradition treaty and still prosecute the ac-
cused in the United States.86
Lopez fled to Mexico after being charged with violating U.S. narcot-
ics laws.8 7 Despite an existing extradition treaty, Lopez was forcibly
brought to the U.S. from Mexico, arrested and then prosecuted in U.S.
courts.88 The Mexican government intervened and demanded the surren-
der of Lopez to Mexican officials.89 Despite the country's objection, the
U.S. refused to surrender Lopez to the Mexican government as required
by the extradition treaty.9° Moreover, the district court supported the
United States' abduction by holding that U.S. noncompliance would not
bar the prosecution of Lopez in the United States for his violation of
82. 3 Abbell & Ristau, supra note 4, at 133.
83. Treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal Matters, 1984, United States -
Uruguay, 35 U.S.T. 3197, T.I.A.S. No. 10850.
84. Id. at 3217. Article two of the treaty lists over 30 extraditable offenses. These
offenses include murder, abortion, assault, the illegal use of arms, rape, abandonment,
prostitution, fraud, bigamy, and unlawful production and distribution of psychotropic
drugs. Id. at 3201-02.
85. 6 F.Supp. 342 (D. Texas 1934).
86. Id. at 344.
87. Id. at 343.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 343. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the Mexican gov-
ernment's claim regarding a violation of its sovereignty. According to the court, the issue
was one for the Executive Department of the United States - which then refused to sur-
render Mr. Lopez to Mexico. Id. at 344.





Multilateral treaties are usually formed to address particular types of
substantive crimes that are of concern to many countries. Multilateral
treaties focusing on drug trafficking have been in existence since 1961.92
On December 20, 1984, nations signed the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 93
the most recent multilateral treaty addressing modem problems associated
with combating drug trafficking. The Convention was drafted broadly to
facilitate the prosecution of individuals involved in a general scheme of
illicit activity.94 Article Three of the U.N. Convention requires signatory
nations to adopt domestic laws and measures that make it illegal to man-
ufacture and distribute narcotics or psychotropic substances in any man-
ner.95 Most importantly, signatory nations to the U.N. Convention agreed
to render judicial assistance to one another.96
Several provisions of the multilateral treaty require signatories to
provide international judicial assistance by obligating them to engage in
extradition, to engage in mutual legal assistance, and to provide transfer
of proceedings and other forms of cooperation and training.97 Further, the
treaty "mandates the widest measures of mutual legal assistance in inves-
tigation, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal of-
fenses" that are enumerated in the treaty.98 Under the treaty a nation may
request mutual legal assistance for the following reasons: "taking evi-
dence or statements from persons; effecting service of judicial docu-
ments; executing searches and seizures; examining sites and objects; pro-
viding information and evidence; providing originals or certified copies
of relevant documents and records, including bank, financial, corporate or
business records; and identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instru-
91. Id. at 344. See also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). In
Alvarez-Machain, a fugitive was forcibly brought to the U.S. from Mexico for violations
of U.S. laws without complying with the extradition treaty. Id. at 657. Like Lopez, al-
though the provisions of the extradition treaty were ignored, the fugitive was brought to
trial in the U.S. for his alleged violations of U.S. laws. Id.
92. See Multilateral Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18
U.S.T. 1424.
93. U.N. Doc. E/CNF 82/15 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
94. Zagaris, supra note 63, at 343-44.
95. 28 I.L.M. at 494.
96. Id. at 343-44.
97. See id. at 506-12.
98. Id. at 508.
19961
214 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
mentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes." 99
While narcotics and psychotropic substances are important issues
and are a focus of multilateral treaties, other international offenses such
as terrorism, genocide, and other human rights violations also form the
basis of multilateral agreements. For example, the International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages'00 entered into force for the United
States on January 6, 1985.101 While this multilateral treaty relates to the
substantive offense of the taking of hostages, it also provides for interna-
tional judicial assistance in the execution of its provisions. Specifically,
Article 11 of the treaty stipulates that "1. States-Parties shall afford one
another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion [sic] with crimi-
nal proceedings... including the supply of all evidence at their disposal
necessary for the proceedings [and] 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of
this article shall not affect obligations concerning mutual judicial assis-
tance embodied in any other treaty.' °2 While multilateral treaties nor-
mally include mutual legal assistance procedures, the terms of such assis-
tance are usually vague. Accordingly, member states may need to rely on
already existing mutual legal assistance treaties or domestic legislative
procedures for international judicial assistance in most international crim-
inal matters.
7. INTERPOL
In addition to the numerous agreements that assist nations with the
investigation and prosecution of international crimes, 03 the International
Criminal Police Organization ("INTERPOL") serves as a unique interna-
tional organization that furnishes international judicial assistance.104 IN-
TERPOL has become an increasingly important organization for acquir-
ing evidence and information located in foreign countries for use in
domestic criminal proceedings. 0 5
"INTERPOL was founded in 1923 when police chiefs from 20
countries met on their own initiative in Vienna."0 6 The organization is
99. Id. at 508.
100. T.I.A.S. 11081, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
101. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties To Which the United States Is a Party, 34
I.L.M. 590, 591 (1995).
102. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, T.I.A.S. 11081 at
11081, 18 I.L.M. at 1461.
103. See supra notes 62-102 and accompanying text.
104. See Re Kendall, Interpol's Co-operation System and Activities Relating to Fo-
rensic Science, 31 J. OF THE FoRENSiC Sd. SOCIETY 373 (1991).
105. Id. at 374.
106. MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL
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primarily concerned with combating crimes and providing international
judicial assistance in investigating those crimes which have "international
ramifications with regard to the person committing the crime, the acts
constituting the crime or the consequences flowing from those acts."'0
INTERPOL's involvement usually occurs when criminals either flee to
other countries or commit international drug, currency, property or person
trafficking.' 8
The United States has been a member of INTERPOL since the
1930s; however, it was not until the 1970s that INTERPOL gained sub-
stantial support from the U.S. The authority for U.S. membership and
participation in INTERPOL comes from an Act of Congress, which pro-
vides that the U.S. shall provide a delegate to INTERPOL and pay its
annual fees to the organization. 109 The U.S. has steadily increased its as-
signment of law enforcement personnel at INTERPOL headquarters and
at the United States-National Central Bureau.110 This demonstration of
support by the United States, as well as by numerous other countries, has
made INTERPOL's role in providing international judicial assistance in
criminal matters a more substantial one."'
Unlike most international organizations, INTERPOL was created by
individual law enforcement officials of numerous countries, without sup-
port from the individual governments." 2 It was established as a private,
non-governmental and non-political entity. 13 In fact, INTERPOL's consti-
tution and current obligations prohibit its involvement in political
activities." 4
Since its creation, INTERPOL has survived two world wars, and its
infiltration and acquisition by the Nazis." 5 However, the need for effec-
tive cooperation in international criminal matters has undoubtedly led to
the perseverance of the organization. The legitimacy of INTERPOL
CRnzmNAL JusncE page vii (1989).
107. Id. at 374.
108. Kendall, supra note , at 375.
109. Fooner, supra note 107, at 165. See also, 22 U.S.C. § 263a. Pursuant to this
statute, the Attorney General is authorized to accept and maintain, on behalf of the
United States, membership in the International Criminal Police Organization, and to des-
ignate any departments and agencies which may participate in the United States represen-
tation with that organization. All dues and expenses are paid out of sums appropriated for
the Department of Justice. 22 U.S.C. § 263a.
110. Abbell & Ristau, supra note 4, at 19.
111. See Dominicans Deport Bloch for U.S. Trial, N.Y. TioMS, June 1, 1995 at DI.
112. Fooner, supra note 107, at 7. See also Kendall, supra note 104, at 373.
113. Fooner, supra note 107, at 40.
114. Id.
115. See Fooner, supra note 107, at 40.
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stems from its early association with the League of Nations." 6 At the
League of Nations' Convention on Counterfeit Currency, INTERPOL
was designated as the enforcement mechanism of the agreement and
member parties were obligated to cooperate with INTERPOL in the ful-
fillment of the provisions of the Treaty." 7
The primary investigative tasks of INTERPOL are carried out
through its National Central Bureau (hereinafter "NCB") network. Each
member-state hosts a NCB office which serves as the channel for com-
munication of requests between law enforcement authorities and member-
states." 8 Law enforcement authorities within the United States who seek
INTERPOL's assistance must submit their request to the U.S.-NCB,
which is located within the Department of Justice."19 Upon receipt of a
request, the U.S.-NCB will submit the request to the NCB of the relevant
foreign country and/or INTERPOL's headquarters in Lyons, France. 20
The NCB of each country is required to fulfill three services: one, it
must provide information to any police office of its own country; two, it
must provide assistance and/or respond to requests made directly from
another NCB member country; and, three, it must provide assistance with
regard to any requests from INTERPOL headquarters.' 2'
INTERPOL headquarters and its permanent departments also pro-
vide a practical foundation and effective mechanism for the exchange of
information and documentation. INTERPOL headquarters complements
the INTERPOL NCB network. Any NCB member can request informa-
tion or assistance directly from any other NCB office. 22 If an NCB
member does not know which NCB office from which to request infor-
mation, or if the NCB requires assistance from several countries, the best
route is to make a request to INTERPOL headquarters. 23
At INTERPOL headquarters, cases and information are processed
according to files reflecting international information on an individual or
subject matter. 24 INTERPOL headquarters may assist in locating a fugi-
tive located in any one of several countries.'25 An NCB member may re-
quest that INTERPOL headquarters issue a "Wanted Notice" regarding a
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id. at 9.
118. See Kendall, supra note 104, at 375-76.
119. Fooner, supra note 107, at 116-17, 122.
120. See Art Barnum, Interpol Officer Urges Chiefs to Attack Crime in Global Way,
Cu. TRm., April 2, 1993, at D2.
121. See Fooner, supra note 107, at 116.
122. Kendall, supra note 104, at 376.
123. See id. at 376.
124. Fooner, supra note 107, at 100-01.
125. See generally Fooner, supra note 107, at 127-60.
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fugitive. 2' 6 INTERPOL will then, after determining whether the request-
ing country has an extradition treaty in force with the requested country,
issue a "Wanted Notice" through the NCB office of the requested coun-
try. 127 INTERPOL headquarters may then inform other countries about
the escaped fugitive. This process removes the burden of requiring the
requesting country to personally notify each individual country. This type
of assistance could not be accomplished without an organization struc-
tured like INTERPOL. Without the assistance of the NCBs, police offers
from various countries would need to make personal requests to appro-
priate authorities.'2 This could prove too time consuming and unfruitful
in combatting crime, especially for those officers who do not possess for-
eign contacts.'2
Agents of INTERPOL consist of members of the NCBs of each
member country and members of the staff at INTERPOL headquarters.
The staff members at INTERPOL'S headquarters are nationals of several
different countries. 130 At present, INTERPOL functions primarily as an
information organization with no independent enforcement authority.'3' It
assists in the transfer and exchange of information between sovereign po-
lice forces around the world. In order to protect privacy and individual
rights, INTERPOL agents are bound by certain procedural require-
ments. 32 The actual issuance of police search and/or arrest warrants are
carried out by local, domestic police officers, who are under no obliga-
tion to respect an INTERPOL "Wanted Notice."' 33 INTERPOL'S
"Wanted Notice" system simply alerts local police forces of the exis-
tence of an arrest warrant for an individual in another country.' 34 Local
authorities have discretion in actual enforcement of the warrant. 35 If a
fugitive is arrested and detained pursuant to a "Wanted Notice" issued
by INTERPOL, the actual process of having the fugitive extradited to the
requesting country is normally carried out through diplomatic channels.'3
126. Id. at 153-56. See also Katherine Ellison, Merchant of Death? Prove It, He
Says, MIAMI HERALD, May 26, 1995, at Al. (discussing INTERPOL's orders to arrest a
well-known Chilean criminal).
127. Fooner, supra note 107, at 141-42.
128. Id. at 118.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 92.
131. Id. at 90-91.
132. Fooner, supra note 107, at 134-36.
133. Id. at 154.
134. Id. at 142.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id. at 140.
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While diplomacy may be an excellent avenue for solving disputes
between countries, it is not always effective in the area of criminal inves-
tigation and prosecution, where political and other considerations may
override the pursuit for justice. Since INTERPOL may not work to carry
out political objectives, pursuant to its own Constitution, it has not been
involved in politically motivated or domestic law enforcement extradition
procedures. 37
In sum, INTERPOL'S intended purpose of fighting international
crime is limited. Its assistance only involves the investigation and in-
cludes no independent enforcement measures. 38 Like many international
agreements and organizations, it lacks enforcement mechanisms, which is
its primary obstacle to achieving its goal of effectively fighting interna-
tional crime.
Ill. EFFEcTIvENESs OF EXISTING SYSTEM IN CARRYING OUr JUSTICE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
As evidenced above, international justice is currently carried out in a
piece-meal fashion. Countries assist one another in particular circum-
stances and when political considerations support following through with
commitments to international agreements. Even if certain countries pro-
vide international judicial assistance to each other in some matters, there
is no certainty that in any other similar instance an accused will be
brought to justice.1 39
At present, most countries have recognized a number of acts with
international aspects as criminal. In fact, most countries have recognized
the existence of certain core "international crimes."' 4 This is evidenced
by the U.N. Security Council's recent establishment of International
Criminal Tribunals to prosecute war criminals in Bosnia and Rwanda,
and the international community's approval of such measures.' 4 Yet, de-
spite the recognition of certain international crimes and the efforts to
prosecute violators of "international laws," the current international
criminal justice system is less than harmonized.
137. Id. at 154.
138. Id. at 90-91.
139. For example, a particular country may agree to extradite a national to a foreign
country for murder charges, but may refuse the return of another national to another
country for the same charges. This is more likely to occur when the particular country
considers punishment in another country contrary to its own laws.
140. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
141. See Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and International Criminal Law, 28 AKRON
L. REV. 421 (1995).
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In the midst of the existing U.S. domestic policies, bilateral and
multilateral agreements and occasional ad-hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, it has been proposed that a permanent international criminal
court be established to further the efforts of bringing international
criminals to justice. A permanent international criminal court, some ar-
gue, would effectively carry out justice in the international arena; how-
ever, an International Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction and author-
ity would be no different than the ICJ. 142 By considering and
implementing the proposals suggested in this article, an International
Criminal Court could develop into a truly recognized and effective insti-
tution for carrying out justice.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The International Law Commission's Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court
At the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly,
members of the U.N.'s Sixth (Legal) Committee (hereinafter "the Com-
mittee") considered several proposals submitted by the International Law
Commission, including a draft Statute for the establishment of a perma-
nent international criminal court. 43 The Committee considered the vari-
ous elements of the proposed International Criminal Court and recog-
nized that several aspects of the Court required further consideration.'"
In particular, the proposed draft raised issues regarding the Court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. These issues were: one, whether genocide would
be an exception to the court's consent jurisdiction; two, the Security
Council's power to determine actual acts of aggression and authority to
refer cases to the court; three, the relationship of the court and the
United Nations; and, four, the court's funding. 45 While some members
preferred to limit the functions and authority of the Security Council
under the draft Statute, the United States favored giving the Security
Council the exclusive authority to refer cases involving war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide.'4
142. See, e.g. American Bar Association Task Force on International Criminal
Court, supra note 3.
143. Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth
Committee at the Forty-Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
607, 613 (1995).
144. Id. at 613-15.
145. Id. at 614.
146. Id.
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Despite the apparent disparity over several aspects of the draft stat-
ute, it was considered by several Committee members to provide "a solid
basis for the negotiation of a treaty establishing such a Court, which
would be closely linked to the United Nations by a separate agreement,
as envisioned in the draft."' 47 In requesting continued efforts to develop
an International Criminal Court, committee members "indicated [their]
general reluctance to continue ... [the current methods for prosecuting
violators of international crimes, which include] ...the Security Coun-
cil['s] [creation] of ad hoc tribunals, which... [can] ... not provide the
same level of deterrence or universal application of international criminal
law" as an International Criminal Court.1
48
B. The American Bar Association ("ABA") Task Force's Proposed
Statute for an International Criminal Court
The ABA Task Force's proposed Statute for an International Crimi-
nal Court is another example of the current efforts to establish a perma-
nent International Criminal Court. 149 The ABA Task Force, like the Inter-
national Law Commission, attempts to create an adequate foundation for
establishing an International Criminal Court by detailing the purpose, ju-
risdiction, subject matter and other important elements of the Interna-
tional Court. In particular, the ABA Task Force's proposed Statute sets
forth the specific crimes that would fall within the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction under Article 22.150 In addition, Article 23 provides
the methods by which a nation could accept or decline jurisdiction with
regard to specific crimes. "I
Pursuant to Article 23, member-states could refuse to consent to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in any particular case. 52
Accordingly, the Court's jurisdiction would depend on the discretion of
the member-states on a case by case basis. This jurisdictional provision,
however, would severely weaken the International Criminal Court's effec-
tiveness. Although it may prove difficult for member countries to agree
to respect the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, only the real
possibility of being brought before the International Criminal Court will
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See American Bar Association Task Force on International Criminal Court,
supra note 3.
150. Id. at 515. These crimes include genocide and other related crimes, apartheid,
hostage takings, crimes against a diplomat, and unlawful seizure of an aircraft. Id. at 515-
16.




work to effectively enforce violations of international crimes. The opting
out provisions of the ABA's proposed Statute, while similar to several
existing international agreements and the International Law Commis-
sions's proposed Statute provisions, poses the same problem of ineffec-
tive enforcement that plagues most existing international agreements.
Therefore, without any real authority to compel jurisdiction over
parties, which is one of the major weaknesses of both the ABA Task
Force's and the International Law Commission's draft Statutes, the Inter-
national Criminal Court will become the criminal equivalent of the ICJ. 53
To the extent that the ICJ accomplishes certain objectives, it is effective
primarily because cases brought before the ICJ often involve relatively
nonviolent actions and only member-states may be brought before it.
154
Since the nature of ICJ disputes are relatively nonviolent, it is clear that
in disputes involving criminal activities, it would be even more difficult
to encourage member-states to submit to the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, any International Criminal Court without
real compulsory jurisdiction provisions and authority will be of little use
to the effective apprehension and prosecution of international criminals.
The International Criminal Court's jurisdiction must be compulsory if it
is to be effective.
Although an International Criminal Court has yet to be established,
once an International Criminal Court is created, enforcement mechanisms
will be required. These enforcement mechanisms will include methods
for investigating, apprehending, prosecuting and punishing international
criminals. The ABA Task Force's proposed Statute allows the Security
Council to function as the enforcement mechanism for the "international
crimes" listed in the Statute."' Article 60 of the proposed Statute recog-
nizes the need for international judicial assistance in order to prosecute
cases before the Court and confirm the member-states' right to confer
with INTERPOL when conducting international investigations. 5 6
Whether the International Criminal Court takes the form of that pro-
posed by the ABA's Task Force or the International Law Commission, or
that of an entirely new configuration, it should take a reserved role in the
investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment of international
criminals. In this regard, the proposed permanent International Criminal
153. See American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice and
the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law Reports to the House of Delegates,
29 TnE INT'L LAWYER 295, 297 (1995).
154. U.N. CHARTEr art 34, para 1.
155. American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court,
supra note 3, at 494.
156. Id. at 530.
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Court should not displace any effective remedies that exist today for in-
vestigating, apprehending, prosecuting and punishing international
criminals. Instead, any investigations and/or arrests (ie: by INTERPOL
agents) and any prosecutions and/or punishments (ie: carried out by Pros-
ecutors appointed by the U.N. and prisons operated by the U.N.) should
not be initiated unless the existing enforcement mechanisms (ie: mutual
legal assistance and extradition agreements) have failed to provide an ad-
equate remedy, and an international criminal would otherwise go without
punishment for his criminal action.
C. The International Law Commission's Proposed Draft International
Criminal Code
In addition to its draft Statute for a permanent International Criminal
Court, the International Law Commission, a subdivision of the U.N., has
also proposed a draft international criminal code. The proposed Code at-
tempts to define international crimes. 5 7 One purpose of the draft Code is
also to specify certain human rights violations that would fall within the
jurisdiction of a permanent International Criminal Court, if and when
such a Court is established. 158 In addition to the Law Commission's
Code, members of the U.N. also published a draft code in 1980. This
code lists terrorism, hijacking, and environmental crimes as incidents that
would require solutions from an International Criminal Court.159 Interest-
ingly enough, several crimes under the Code have already been described
as "international crimes" by the international community pursuant to ex-
isting international agreements. For example, various international agree-
ments have already labeled genocide, drug trafficking, money laundering
and terrorism as "international crimes".' 60
V. ESTABLISHING AN EFFECrIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. Creation of an International Criminal Court
The first consideration in creating a permanent International Crimi-
nal Court is the authority and basis for its existence. Several possible
methods for creating an International Criminal include an institution cre-
157. Daniel B. Pickard, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward a Perma-
nent International Court for the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human Rights
Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 435, 453 (1995).
158. Id. at 454.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
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ated by the U.N. Security Council, by separate treaty, or by international
agreement.
1. An Institution Created by the U.N. Security Council Under the
Authority of Art. VII of the U.N. Charter
The Bosnian and Rwanda ad-hoc Tribunals were brought into being
by the U.N. Security Council's broad interpretation of its authority under
Article VII of the U.N. Charter.' 61 In determining "that there [was] a
threat to international peace," the Security Council created the Bosnian
and Rwanda Tribunals. 62
Some have argued that the U.N. could create a permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court under the Security Council's Article VII author-
ity. 63 An important consequence of a permanent International Criminal
Court created by the Security Council would be that the U.N. could take
action against a member-country who failed to comply with the Court or
its objectives. No opting out provisions would be available, as in the
ABA Task Force's and the International Law Commission's draft
Statutes.164
2. A Separate Treaty
In its draft statute for a permanent International Criminal Court, the
International Law Commission proposed that a separate treaty create an
International Criminal Court.1 65 According to the Commission's proposal,
the court would operate as a separate entity with an indirect connection
161. United Nations: Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International
Tribunal For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Law Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), re-
printed in 32 I.L. M. 1203, 1204 (1993). United Nations: Security Council Resolution
955 (1994) Establishing the International Tribunal For Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1598, 1601 (1994).
162. Pickard, supra note 157, at 438-39.
163. Dean N. Reinhardt, The United States Military and United Nations Peacekeep-
ing Operations, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 245, 253 (1996). Article 39 bestows upon the Se-
curity Council the power to "determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what mea-
sures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 39.
164. The Security Council has the power to implement economic sanctions and
other enforcement procedures to give effect to its decisions. U.N. CHARTER art. 41-42.
165. American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court,
supra note 3, at 480.
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to the U.N. Security Council.'6
3. Other Proposals
Finally, existing international agreements could form the basis of a
permanent International Criminal Court. Several existing international
agreements on crimes of international concern, such as terrorism, money
laundering and tax evasion, could be amended to provide a permanent fo-
rum for the prosecution of the specific criminal acts set forth in the par-
ticular agreements. Of course, the methods for investigating, appre-
hending, prosecuting and punishing international criminals would need
further development, but the international agreements could be the foun-
dations for such permanent tribunal(s).
B. Structure of the International Criminal Court System
Whether the International Criminal Court is created by the U.N. Se-
curity Council, a separate treaty, or by any other method, once the Inter-
national Criminal Court is created, the structure of the international crim-
inal court system will need to be considered.
1. Single International Criminal Court
It is possible that the International Criminal Court would include
only one permanent institution as the forum for prosecuting violators of
"international crimes." If this were the case, it seems clear that the
Court's jurisdiction would be limited to only a few specific crimes that
were unquestionably of international concern, such as genocide. If the In-
ternational Criminal Court had jurisdiction over a number of an "interna-
tional crimes," the need for additional forums would most likely occur.
2. Several Different Forums of the International Criminal Court
The need for more than one location or set of international judges
for the International Criminal Court is apparent in light of the jurisdic-
tional differences between the proposed International Criminal Court and
the ICJ. In particular, the ICJ's jurisdiction is limited to its authority over
member-states, which are approximately 185 in number. 67 To be effec-
tive, the International Criminal Court would have jurisdiction over any
166. Id. at 483-84.
167. David Bills, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The




possible individual violator of "international laws" in the world - bil-
lions of individuals. Of course, although the majority of the world's pop-
ulation are not violators of "international laws," the jurisdictional conse-
quences and the impracticability of only one forum is evident.
3. Other Proposals
Another possible structure of the International Criminal Court sys-
tem is the creation of Regional Criminal Courts. These Regional Courts
could fulfill various functions and could achieve significant results in
certain circumstances. For example, a country may not want to surrender
a fugitive to another country or prosecute the individual in his own coun-
try, yet there may still be a desire to prosecute the individual in an alter-
nate forum. In these instances, Regional Courts (or the International
Criminal Court) could be utilized to bring a criminal to justice without
surrendering him to another country.
A Regional Court could be established through an existing regional/
multilateral treaty or through an entirely new agreement. Alternatively, a
Regional Court could be merely a "branch" of the International Criminal
Court, and the U.N. could appoint officials to carry out regional investi-
gations and to act as Regional Prosecutors and Judges.
Regional Courts could also be utilized in connection with national
court decisions and fulfill an appellate function. For various reasons, a
particular country may want to prosecute an individual in its own courts
but allow the individual to appeal the national court's judgment directly
to a Regional Criminal Court (or directly to the International Criminal
Court). Cases brought before Regional Courts (or the International Crimi-
nal Court), whether cases of first instance or brought on appeal, would
be reviewed de novo in order to ensure adequate review of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
The ability of those accused and convicted of international crimes to
appeal to a Regional Court, the International Criminal Court, or some
other International Criminal Tribunal would further ensure that the indi-
viduals were afforded adequate procedural protection and that their cases,
which involved "international crimes", were heard before unbiased and
qualified arbiters.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
1. Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Several personal and subject matter jurisdictional issues arise in con-
nection with the implementation of an International Criminal Court.
Whether the Court's jurisdiction extends to all individuals everywhere,
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only to nationals of member-states who have consented to the Court's ju-
risdiction, or only over individuals who have consented to the Court's ju-
risdiction are issues that need to be addressed when considering the es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court.
As mentioned above, both the International Law Commission's and
the ABA Task Force's proposed Statutes for an International Criminal
Court support the position that a country must consent to the Court's ju-
risdiction in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a national of
that country. 68 As set forth in the International Law Commission's draft,
however, the crime of genocide would be an exception to'the "consent"
requirement regarding jurisdiction. This is largely due to the fact that ge-
nocide is recognized as an international crime. 69
Therefore, according to some, the majority of "international crimes"
within the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction would first require a
particular country's consent to the Court's jurisdiction. However, as ar-
gued above, the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court would
be seriously undermined if its jurisdiction was determined by a member-
country's "consent" in any given case.
2. Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
Unlike the ICJ, the International Criminal Court would exercise ju-
risdiction over individuals and therefore, its jurisdiction should be com-
pulsory. The benefits of a compulsory International Criminal Court would
be substantial. For example, the International Criminal Court could exist
as a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of war criminals without the
possibility of an accused escaping trial simply because of a lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction due to a lack of consent. 70
With the creation of an International Criminal Court with compul-
sory jurisdiction over "international criminals," the establishment of a
Nuremberg-type tribunal or one similar to the recent ad-hoc Tribunals in
Bosnia and Rwanda would no longer be necessary. Further, it would be
much more difficult for war criminals to go free simply because of the
complications and delays resulting from the creation of an ad-hoc tribu-
nal. 171 With a permanent International Criminal Court in place, perpetra-
168. American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court,
supra note 3, at 516-17.
169. Morris & Bourloyannis -Vrailas, supra note 143, at 614.
170. American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court,
supra note 3, at 516-17.
171. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18 FORD-
HAM INT'L L. J. 1191, 1208-09 (1995).
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tors of war crimes would be aware - and hopefully would be deterred
by the knowledge - that action against them was not only possible, but
likely.
For example, if an International Criminal Court with compulsory ju-
risdiction were in place today, Bosnian war criminals would most likely
have already been brought to trial for their violations of international
laws, because acts of genocide and torture are recognized as "interna-
tional crimes" by the international community. 72
Absent the unconditional consent to the International Criminal
Court's jurisdiction, motivation for accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court could be achieved through economic
measures. For instance, future agreements similar to the recently adopted
North American Free Trade Agreement could require all member parties
to agree to the Court's jurisdiction and to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of violators of international laws. 7 3
D. Applicable Law
Once the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court has been
established, a determination of applicable law must be made. It is possi-
ble that the International Criminal Court will apply a general "interna-
tional law" to the cases before it, because to date no "International
Criminal Code" exists. 74 Several draft International Criminal Codes have
been considered, including the one proposed by the International Law
Commission mentioned above, and any one of them could be adopted in
connection with the creation of an International Criminal Court.
It might seem today that a world in which one set of rules applies
to all is an impossibility. Even toda,'s "international judicial assistance"
system for bringing criminals to justice appears to be accomplishing a
great deal and establishing certain activities as "international crimes",
despite the many differences among nations and the divergent national
criminal codes. In fact, a world in which a set of systematic procedures
172. Compulsory jurisdiction over an individual would depend on whether the indi-
vidual was a national of a signatory country to the treaty establishing the International
Criminal Court or whether the crime was actually committed in a signatory country. Con-
sequently, if neither the individual's country nor the country in which the crime was com-
mitted had consented to the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, the ICC would not
have compulsory jurisdiction over that individual.
173. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 3311 et seq. (West Supp. 1996).
174. Pickard, supra note 157, at 453-54. An international criminal code does not ex-
ist to date because of the reluctance of nations to surrender a portion of their sovereignty.
Id. at 453.
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and substantive laws are applied to citizens of many different nations
may be an appropriate aspiration.
Some have proposed the development of an international code of
crimes for several years now. 175 While an International Criminal Code
would certainly complement an international criminal court system, it is
not necessary for the International Criminal Court's creation. To the con-
trary, the creation of an International Criminal Court would likely ad-
vance the development of a code of international crimes. Cases brought
before the court could form the foundation for defining "international
crimes." This procedure could develop into customary international law.
Furthermore, certain "international crimes" are already recognized as
such by the international community.176 Whether set forth in an Interna-
tional Criminal Code or established by reference to existing international
agreements listing "international crimes", the types of crimes that will
fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court must be determined if the Court is to be effective.
E. Standing to Bring an Action Before the International Criminal
Court
Another important consideration with respect to the development of
an International Criminal Court is the question of standing. Whether only
international prosecutors (ie: appointed by the U.N.)177 would be able to
bring a case before the Court, whether officials of member-states could
appear before the Court to prosecute violators of international laws, or
whether individuals could present a case to the International Criminal
Court are factors that should be considered in the development of the In-
ternational Criminal Court.
One option would be to designate U.N.-appointed Prosecutors as the
only parties with standing to bring a case before the International Crimi-
nal Court. Under these circumstances, certain procedures could be imple-
mented to ensure that member-states and individuals could at least notify
the International Criminal Court of violations of international laws. For
example, a Probable Cause Panel, formed by U.N. appointees or mem-
bers of the International Criminal Court, could be established to consider
175. John W. Rolph, Perfecting an International Code of Crimes, 39 FED. B. NEWS
& J. 528, 528 (1992). The U.N. General Assembly first initiated work on a criminal code
entitled "Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1980."
Id.
176. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
177. In addition to the appointment by the U.N., international prosecutors could be
appointed by member-states of a treaty establishing an International Criminal Court.
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claims of international violations submitted by member-states, individuals
or other entities. The Probable Cause Panel could forward the matter to a
U.N.-appointed Prosecutor if it determined that there was probable cause
to believe that a violation of international law had occurred.
F. Enforcement of Violations of "International Crimes" Within the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
1. Investigations
a. Current Methods of Investigation
Once an individual, a member-state or anyone else determines that
an international crime has been or is being committed by another, an in-
vestigation of the alleged "international crime" would be the next step in
the international criminal justice process.
As mentioned above, several bilateral and multilateral agreements al-
ready detail procedures whereby member-states assist one another in con-
ducting criminal investigations that cross borders. The development of an
International Criminal Court questions the existing methods of interna-
tional investigation and whether those methods would be replaced by in-
vestigative authority created by the U.N., the International Criminal
Court or a treaty created by contracting parties of the International Crim-
inal Court. Any supra-national authority to investigate "international
crimes" created in conjunction with the International Criminal Court
should be exercised only when existing international judicial assistance
agreements or other international practices fail to adequately investigate
an international crime.
Of course, determining when existing methods of investigation are
inadequate so that a supra-national investigating authority could investi-
gate an international crime would require careful consideration. This is-
sue might best be resolved on a case by case basis by a U.N. or Court-
appointed Panel similar to the Probable Cause Panel mentioned above.
Therefore, if the Panel (or similar reviewing authority) determined
that further investigation of a particular matter was warranted, it could
authorize an international investigation by the supra-national authority.
The supra-national investigating authority could then proceed with an in-
ternational investigation independent of any ongoing national
investigation.
b. INTERPOL Agents as Alternative Investigators
If the U.N., the International Criminal Court or any other entity was
empowered to establish and oversee a supra-national investigating author-
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ity, the form of that authority would need to be determined. Clearly, the
supra-national investigating authority could take several different forms.
One form could allow the U.N., International Criminal Court, or any
other appropriate authority, to appoint supra-national investigators to spe-
cific cases when it was determined that national efforts were inadequate.
Additionally, selected supra-national investigators could be appointed to
investigate all international matters in which national efforts of investiga-
tion were determined to be lacking.
Another possible form of the investigating authority could allow the
appointment of INTERPOL and its agents. Using INTERPOL agents in
supra-national investigations could prove more effective than alternative
methods since the INTERPOL agents would have a direct link to the
country where the investigation was being conducted.
For example, if a supra-national investigation in Colombia was ap-
proved (by a Panel like the one described above or another similar re-
viewing authority) because it was shown that Colombian officials refused
to investigate one a Colombian national who was accused of international
drug trafficking by a member-state or an individual, an INTERPOL agent
located in Colombia would be assigned to the investigation.
Furthermore, it could be .required that the INTERPOL agents who
would investigate an international crime would be nationals of the coun-
try where the investigation was being conducted. As nationals, the IN-
TERPOL agents would already be familiar with the procedural and sub-
stantive laws of the country. The national INTERPOL agents could be
assisted by INTERPOL agents from other related countries, but the na-
tional agents would be in charge of the investigations. Normally, IN-
TERPOL agents would be bound by national due process and other pro-
cedural requirements; however, in exceptional circumstances (such as
when national authorities actively thwarted an INTERPOL investigation),
INTERPOL agents could request permission from an international Panel
to perform certain types of investigations.
c. INTERPOL Agents as Primary Investigators of International Crimes
Alternatively, the U.N., the International Criminal Court or any
other designated authority might want to implement an independent au-
thority for conducting international investigations that would preempt na-
tional or other criminal investigating authorities. Under these circum-
stances, INTERPOL and its agents could be designated as the primary
supra-national investigators of international crimes. Furthermore, since
INTERPOL agents are nationals of many different countries, appointing
them as the primary investigators of international crimes would mean
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that no one country would be the world's policeman.1 78
In order to assume a more active role in international investigations,
INTERPOL could adopt a resolution and/or amend its the Constitution
authorizing the International Criminal Court to adjudicate its cases. IN-
TERPOL's increased authority could also be established by the U.N., by
a treaty, or pursuant to the authority of the International Criminal Court.
With the adoption of INTERPOL and its agents as the international
investigative authority for international crimes, the role of INTERPOL
agents would likely broaden. For example, INTERPOL agents would un-
doubtedly call upon the assistance of their counterparts in other countries,
which would lead to increased dependence and assistance between IN-
TERPOL agents. By making the role of INTERPOL agents more flexi-
ble, effective international investigations would be achieved.
Furthermore, by expanding the role of INTERPOL agents in interna-
tional investigations, INTERPOL agents from any particular country
could be assigned to a branch of any other member country to assist in
an investigation where that agent would significantly contribute to the in-
vestigation. Further, where crimes were frequently committed between
particular countries, each INTERPOL office could be assigned agents
from each respective country who would assist in carrying out investiga-
tions to ensure that the due process and individual rights laws of each
country were not violated. Certainly, the expanded role of INTERPOL in
carrying out international investigations would result in more thorough
and effective investigations. 179
2. Extradition of those Accused of Committing International Crimes
Once one has been accused of committing an international crime
that falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and
the crime has been investigated, methods for apprehending and delivering
the accused to the appropriate forum must be determined. Several options
are available for this stage of the international criminal process.
178. See John F. Murphy, What Ever Happened to the New World Order, 19 S. ILL
U.LJ. 561 (1995) (discussing the role of the U.S. as the world's policeman under the new
world order).
179. The financing of INTERPOL investigations and operations would require spe-
cial consideration. Since a particular country may be inclined to refuse to pay the salaries
of INTERPOL agents and/or the costs for an investigation that the particular country did
not support, a separate international mechanism for financing INTERPOL operations
would most likely be required. Currently, Interpol member-states are required to pay dues
to the organization. In the U.S. INTERPOL membership dues are paid out of the sums
authorized and appropriated by the Department of Justice. 22 U.S.C. §263(a).
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As mentioned above, the existing methods for apprehending and de-
livering an accused to an appropriate forum should be sought before any
other measures are taken. However, if the national officials fail and/or re-
fuse to apprehend and deliver an accused violator of international laws to
the appropriate international forum (i.e., the International Criminal
Court), various alternatives are available to bring the accused to justice.
One of the fundamental provisions of any treaty establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Court should be to commit the signatories to extradite
criminals for trial before the Court.
Among the other alternatives would be to have INTERPOL agents
proceed with apprehending and delivering the accused to the International
Criminal Court. Of course, certain procedural requirements would need to
be fulfilled in this exceptional circumstance. For example, an INTERPOL
agent would be required to receive some type of approval or "interna-
tional arrest warrant" from a judge sitting on the International Criminal
Court or other appropriate authority, such as a Panel similar to the ones
discussed above. Pursuant to the "international arrest warrant", the IN-
TERPOL agent would have the authority to surrender the accused to the
appropriate facilities designated by the International Criminal Court.
3. Prosecution of those Accused of Committing International Crimes
Once an individual accused of committing an international crime is
detained in a facility designated by the International Criminal Court, the
system for prosecuting that individual is the next issue to be resolved. As
indicated above, Prosecutors could be appointed by the U.N. to carry out
this function. The Prosecutors could be selected from member-states to
fill a full-time position of trying cases before the International Criminal
Court, or the U.N. could appoint particular officials of certain countries
who were familiar with specific cases to act as temporary Prosecutors
before the International Criminal Court.
In addition, cases brought before the International Criminal Court
could be decided by one judge or a panel of judges. The International
Criminal Court Statute or implementing mechanism would need to set
forth the number of judges who would sit on the Court and decide cases.
Several different structures of the International Criminal Court could be
implemented. For example, an accused could be prosecuted before one
judge, a panel of judges or even a judge and jury (although this option is
unlikely). 18°
180. It should be noted that the establishment of an International Criminal Court
would also raise U.S. Constitutional considerations, which are beyond the scope of this
paper. The International Criminal Court would need to be consistent with the Fourth,
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G. Enforcement of Judgments Rendered by the International Criminal
Court
The enforcement of judgments rendered by the International Crimi-
nal Court is an issue that must be addressed once the International Crimi-
nal Court is established and its enforcement mechanisms are developed.
As a preliminary matter, however, the International Criminal Court would
need to have the authority and resources to render any of its judgments.
Primarily, this would involve having access to a prison or other facility
for housing both individuals accused and convicted of international
crimes.
As a possible method for enforcing its judgments and criminal
sentences, the International Criminal Court could enter into arrangements
with national prisons to take custody of any individuals accused or con-
victed of an international crime. The International Criminal Court could,
however, build and maintain its own prison facilities. At this stage of the
International Criminal Court's development, it would most likely be more
practical for the International Criminal Court to arrange for the use of
national prisons where international criminals could serve out their
sentences.
Another concern with regard to judgments issued by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court is the issuing of a just and appropriate judgment
(remedy). In deciding an appropriate remedy for a violation of interna-
tional law, the International Criminal Court should consider the length of
imprisonment imposed by the individual's national criminal justice sys-
tem, when possible, before rendering its decisions. This would promote
consistency among the national and international systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Will an International Criminal Court do justice? It may be the only
solution for carrying out justice at the international level. However, the
International Criminal Court should not supplant the existing system that
has taken years to develop. Instead, any International Criminal Court sys-
tem should supplement the existing system to fulfill the objectives of ex-
isting international agreements when the existing enforcement mecha-
nisms fail to bring international criminals to justice. If the creation of an
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. These amendments forbid unlawful
searches and seizures; protect the right of self-incrimination; and provide the right to
counsel and trial by trial respectively. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, V, & VI. But see Paul
D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitution of An International Criminal
Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (1995) (criticizing the U.S. objection to the estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court on constitutional grounds).
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International Criminal Court becomes a reality, its ultimate success will
depend on its ability to effectively investigate, apprehend, prosecute and
punish violators of international crimes. Perhaps through the implementa-
tion of some of the proposals discussed in this paper, the International
Criminal Court will prove to be the solution for effectively fighting inter-
national crime and bringing international criminals to justice.
